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Abstract 
 
Technology transfer is often focused on how to get 
novel technology transferred into an industrial using 
group or company. We focus in this paper on the target 
of the process and present guidelines which can help 
assess the likelihood of a successful transfer. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Someone once told us, as young researchers back in 
the beginning of computer graphics, that transforming a 
thing that works into something that WORKS is hard 
and takes more effort than the initial development.  We 
didn’t understand it then. Over years of trying to get new 
technology successfully adopted in industry (even when 
we were directly employed by industry), we gradually 
came to understand that the transfer process is neither 
easy nor straightforward. 
Researchers are often more concerned with novelty 
than applicability. They are measured by publications, 
and reviewers tend to emphasize novelty much more 
than applicability. Of course, a project can do both.  
Doing both is much harder than just novelty.  
Researchers need to make sure their new method or 
technology actually solves a problem that is important 
to the business community, that it reduces a pain point.  
As Fred Brooks [5] noted: 
A toolmaker succeeds as, and only as, the users 
of his tool succeed with his aid. However shining the 
blade, however jeweled the hilt, however perfect the 
heft, a sword is tested only by cutting. That 
swordsmith is successful whose clients die of old 
age.  
 
Our belief is that new technology that increases 
client’s/user’s success is the ultimate target of 
technology transition.   
In this paper, we examine issues we consider 
important in undertaking technology transfer, identify 
problems, and develop some criteria/guidelines. We 
hope the criteria will help in assessing – and assisting – 
both technology and receivers in increasing the 
probability that future transfers are successful. 
 
 
2. Background 
 
Moving forward with new technology is a well-
discussed, mature topic.  There are clearly numerous 
factors that control the rate of adoption.  The rate itself 
is discussed in [11].  Moore modified the classic 
adoption curve to add a particularly large gap, which he 
referred to as a ‘chasm’, between the early adopters and 
the early-stage main majority. The chasm was meant to 
emphasize the significant difference between these 
groups. Early adopters are the visionaries whereas the 
early majority are pragmatists, only wanting to work 
with proven technology, technology that many others 
have already used successfully.   
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Technology adoption curve with chasm 
 
The introduction of the chasm parallels the authors’ 
experience with technology transfer.  There are 
extensive publications on the technology transfer 
process itself [11]. 
Though Moore addresses the marketing of new 
technology products by high-tech companies, we 
believe his concept applies equally to the transfer of 
technology from academia to industrial firms – and 
more generally from any R&D group (whether small “r” 
large “D” or vice-versa, to any receiving/using group. 
What is less clear is that the duration and depth of 
the chasm varies significantly. In exploring the reasons 
for the different time frames [6], the authors examined 
the time it took for large corporations to adopt, even in 
a limited manner, new computing technology. Adoption 
times varied significantly, from 10 years to not being 
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adopted at all.  In all cases, adoption times were 
surprisingly long.  
The hypothesis in this paper is that having a set of 
clear guidelines, understandable and available to both 
technology developers and potential recipients, would 
be useful to both groups. Technology practitioners often 
believe that their work is beneficial and applicable to 
even the most stubborn customer.  Conversely, and not 
widely understood, potential recipients on the far side of 
The Chasm often find reasons (both rational and 
irrational) to reject new technology and prevent 
competition with current practice.   
The intent of this paper is to develop and present a 
clear set of guidelines to assess the likelihood of 
successfully transitioning technology from a supplier 
(developer/researcher) to an industrial firm.  If the 
guidelines are applied effectively, such projects should 
be more likely to achieve success (or to fail more 
quickly), decrease the overall time needed for adoption, 
and help bridge The Chasm.  
The paper does not attempt to define a rigorous 
process to apply the criteria or run a technology 
transition project. 
 
3. Proposed Criteria  
 
In our research, we saw dozens of papers that talk 
about running technology transition projects, which is 
certainly necessary. Our guidelines are independent of 
the many different transition project management 
possibilities.  
There are clearly hundreds of dimensions that can 
accelerate or deter technology adoption.  In spite of the 
breadth and depth exploration of the technology transfer 
process, there has been little exploration of the factors 
that influence technology transition. [12] did develop 
excellent criteria for judging the success of a project.  
Our intent is different because we want to increase the 
probability of successful transition and therefore 
complements Tan’s work.  
The authors identified four high-level areas with 
factors that influence the adoption of new technology 
and developed guidelines to help assess the adoption 
opportunity: 
• Demonstrated applicability to a company’s 
business problems 
• Willingness of the business community to adopt 
the concept  
• Willingness of the technical community to support 
the concept 
• Adaptability to corporate infrastructure 
The general relationships among these factors are 
illustrated in fig. 2, which shows the model we have 
adapted to describe the technology transfer-adoption -
transition process. 
 
 
Figure 2: Model of technology transition process. 
 
Even though our primary experience is with 
computing technology, we assert that our guidelines 
apply to transitioning and deploying any new 
technology.  Inputs (arrows from the left) to the model 
are the technology to be transferred/transitioned and the 
business problem to be solved.  There are two controls 
(arrows from the top): what the technology community 
or supplier ‘thinks’ and what the business community or 
receptor thinks. The environmental infrastructure 
(called mechanisms and represented by the arrow at the 
bottom) defines the context into which the new 
technology must fit or which must be changed to 
accommodate the new technology.  By applying the 
criteria discussed below, we produce the likelihood (the 
arrow on the right) that the technology will be adopted. 
The process is iterative. Changing the inputs, controls, 
and mechanism can increase or decrease the odd of 
success.   
Primary inputs: 
• The technology itself. We don’t restrict the supplier 
of the technology to an academic research group: it 
could equally well be another company or another 
division/department within the receiving company  
• Applicability to business problems.  Applicability 
is of course crucial - suggesting that a specific 
technology is applicable to a company without a 
demonstrated fit makes success virtually 
impossible.  Note that the need for any imported 
technology can change over time.  For example, 
Boeing hired the U.S.’s leading concrete experts in 
the 1960’s to insure success in building Minuteman 
missiles in the cold climate of the Dakotas.  Once 
the project was successfully completed, the experts 
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gradually left and were not replaced.  Similarly, 
GM developed significant computer graphics 
expertise in the ‘60s and ‘70s in order to develop its 
CAD system, but as third-party firms developed 
suitable products and expertise, GM’s need was 
correspondingly reduced and they moved from an 
in-house system to a vendor-supplied one. 
 
Controls govern the internal rapidity with which new 
technology is adopted.  The controls can result in a range 
of rates from rapid deployment to total stoppage and 
include: 
• Willingness of the business community.  The 
business community contains the people, data, and 
materials that define and solve specific product-
related problems.  This community produces new 
knowledge, products, ideas, etc. that others 
consume.  For example, intelligence analysts are 
given problems and data from which they make 
recommendations.  Political, military, and business 
people make decisions based on analyst 
recommendations and other information.  
Ultimately, the business community will directly 
use new technology. 
• Willingness of the technical community.  The 
business community often asks the technical 
community to independently examine the 
robustness and suitability of new technology.  The 
technical community may be inside or outside a 
company. 
The mechanisms of the corporate infrastructure must 
be understood to assess the amount of change that may 
be needed to implement new technology in production. 
In this case, the mechanism is: 
• The existing corporate infrastructure-environment.  
Any company, be it a century old or a start-up, has 
operational constraints.  Infrastructure 
mechanisms range from supply chain to drayage to 
computing resources to job definitions to available 
electrical power to business community expertise.  
New technology must be able to fit into the 
environment or justify modification/expansion.  
For example, all-electric cars work wonderfully as 
long as there are reliable charging stations.  
Adding stations to make recharging as convenient 
and readily available as fossil fuels is happening 
gradually. 
The model output is the likelihood that the 
technology will be adopted.  The rest of this section 
describes the criteria the authors, both of whom worked 
as transfer technology insiders in large companies, 
learned that must be considered to improve the chances 
of a successful transition of a specific technology. 
The authors recommend that readers assess all 
aspects listed below early and often to increase the odds 
of success.  Implementing any technology successfully 
is a time-consuming process, often a multi-year or even 
multi-decade task.  Assessing early and often should 
reduce the time taken by ‘The Chasm’ in Moore’s 
technology adoption curve and make new technology 
more broadly available in a shorter period of time. 
By technology community, we refer to the group 
supplying the technology to be transferred. This could 
be an academic research group or an R&D group within 
the (receiving) business community, a start-up 
company, or a new supplier.  
By business community, we refer to the organization 
to which the technology is proposed to be transferred.  
Thus the two sides of the transfer process, on 
opposites of the chasm, can be in different organizations 
or in the same organization. The authors have 
experienced both types of transfer efforts.  For example, 
we have successfully transferred technology from an 
academic research group to a large corporate entity and 
have been part of successful efforts to transfer 
technology from a corporate research division into 
manufacturing divisions. 
 
3.1 Applicability to Business Problems 
 
Here we identify issues and topics that must be 
addressed within the receptor or business organization 
with respect to the problem being solved. The basic 
theme is that the probability of success increases when 
the business community can be convinced that the new 
technology can address real problems. Involving the 
business community directly helps get buy-in. 
 
Identify business people who understand the current 
situation and can articulate problems.  
• When there are multiple business people who 
understand the situation, pay attention to the 
internal stature of each person. Are you dealing 
with a user, or with a ‘chooser’, i.e. the individual 
who will ultimately decide to accept or reject new 
technology? Are they high enough in the 
organization to control the resources needed for 
adoption? 
• Examine cause and motivation for the perceived 
problem(s). 
• Identify specific cases that are problematic; 
generalizations are difficult to sell internally. 
Find test cases and data sets for experimentation 
• Willingness to explore specific cases that cause 
problems 
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• Accept that modifications to new technology may 
be needed in case exploration has poor results. 
• Be prepared to deal with difficulties in obtaining 
access to data – many ‘owners’ are very protective.  
Review results with business people 
• Get first hand reaction to test results 
• discuss with both users and choosers who may have 
quite different viewpoints. 
Document and communicate what went well and what 
didn’t go well 
• Show results outside business circle 
• Get peer review to technical approach 
• If reasonably successful, present to other business 
communities 
Take results to multiple levels of management 
• Identify additional audiences 
• Build case for funding transition 
Know when to quit in the face of continued resistance 
• Be realistic should there be no perceivable 
movement 
 
3.2 Business Community Adoption 
 
Any business community has a set of entrenched 
tools and techniques.  New technology is often a threat 
to adoption.  Adoption odds increase when the 
technology-providing organization understands the 
existing environment.  In short, these criteria help 
understand the competition and position the new 
technology. 
 
Understand existing technology.  If you are proposing 
for e.g. a new software tool, make sure you understand 
the one in current use. 
• Understand the pricing of the current tool set 
• Have an idea of the number of people using the 
tools; convincing a few users to change is easy; 
persuading several hundred is an entirely different 
– and much more expensive – task. 
• Determine advantages new technology may have 
 
Look for places where existing tools have problems that 
new technology (must) solve 
• Know the limitations of existing tools as applied to 
specific business problems 
• Enlist people in the user community who may have 
problems to participate in early tests 
 
 
Do not indict existing tools directly 
• Most user communities love their existing tools 
even if they have issues 
• Understand the limitations in new technology  
 
3.3 Technical Community Support 
 
Most organizations have technical staff who help 
assess and position new technology.  In many 
corporations, the technical staff is in a separate group, 
e.g., the dreaded Information Technology organization 
for new computing tools.  Internal research groups may 
have competing technology and act as a roadblock. 
There are a variety of social and psychological issues 
related to the business’ technical community that must 
be addressed in any effort to transition in new 
technology: 
 
Invented here 
• Management and users often believe that 
technology can't be worth much if someone local 
thought of it first. 
Not invented here 
• Most user communities have technology advocates 
who believe that any technology not invented or 
discovered internally is probably inappropriate or 
inadequate. 
Threatens technical expertise 
• Technical organizations will protect their approach 
because of staffing and funding issues 
 
3.4 Infrastructure Conformance 
 
An often overlooked aspect is an understanding of 
the actual infrastructure of the receiving organization. 
Essentially the better understanding one has of both the 
capabilities of the components of the organization and 
the capabilities of each, the higher the likelihood of 
success. Ideally, new technology is designed to fit into 
the infrastructure ab initio. 
 
Organizational impact 
• Where are the organizational experts in 
existing technology? 
• Impact on existing tools and methods 
• Salary and job descriptions 
• Market demand for specific skills 
• How to provision for a broader community 
• Training 
• For truly new technologies, how to supply 
skills when demand increases 
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Technical infrastructure impact 
• Understand existing tools and their support 
structure (e.g., standards) 
• Impact on physical resources (e.g., compute 
and network power) 
• Gaining access to data 
• Information security 
 
4. Applying the Model: Selected Examples 
 
Since hindsight is 20-20, we applied the model 
(Figure 2) to multiple projects in which one of us 
was directly involved.  We identify the criteria that 
was most influential in making the project a 
success or failure. 
 
4.1 GM CAD 
 
The application that pushed the initial development 
of computer graphics was computer-aided design; early 
research took place at MIT with Sutherland’s Sketchpad 
and at GM Research with DAC-1 in the early ‘60s. At 
GM, CAD was ‘sold’ to upper management as a way to 
reduce cost. In practice, it was used to explore more 
ideas in the same time, thus producing better designs, 
but at little actual cost savings.   
The technology community - researchers at GMR – 
spent a considerable effort in studying what their 
business community really wanted [10]. As Krull noted 
[10], one of the first things the research group 
(technology supplier) did was to hold discussions with 
their business community – the Design and Engineering 
Staffs – where specific tasks were identified (see criteria 
in section 3.1) The question that was being asked was, 
“How could computational techniques significantly 
impact the design process?”  Additionally, multiple 
levels of management were involved, from a high level 
Styling manager down to individual designers (section 
3.1 item 1). Documentation was extensive, including 
publication – peer review (see section 3.1).  The result 
was the DAC 1 system which was in essence a very 
successful ‘existence proof’ that was used to 
demonstrate capability.  
To cross the gap, both a more capable system was 
needed and additional work was required along the lines 
of the items in section 3.2 with the internal business 
community in the form of the motor divisions. 
Considerable effort was spent to convince their design 
management of the probability of success, of the 
probability that this new technology would actually save 
money and time. It was a difficult line for the technical 
community to walk however, since once the managers 
became convinced, they wanted it all, immediately, and 
getting new technology into production of course is 
never immediate. 
In this case, our fig. 2 model would suggest a high 
likelihood of success, given the extensive engagement 
with the business community and the understanding of 
the corporate infrastructure and indeed the project was 
successful, resulting in one of the earliest production 
CAD systems. 
 
4.2 Boeing CAD 
 
Boeing moved into the world of CAD in the late 
1970’s as it developed the 757 and 767.  The initial 
choice of tools targeted producing engineering 
drawings: computer-aided drafting rather than 
computer-aided design tools.  The FAA insisted on 
drawings as the build authority, and Boeing staff was 
accustomed to the drawing process.  Both airplanes were 
commercial successes.  The 757 ceased production in 
2004 because of fuel consumption.  It has yet to be 
replaced by either Boeing or Airbus.  The 767 is still in 
production as a freighter and as the basis for the KC-46 
tanker. 
Boeing quickly realized that the underlying 
mathematics in drawing systems needed to handle 3D 
surfaces and solids.  Therefore, the company started the 
TIGER research program in 1980 and launched a 
commercial product called Axxyz.  The underlying 
math basis was non-uniform rational b-splines 
(NURBS) [4].   
From a technologist perspective, the developers 
achieved significant success.  From a business 
perspective, the project failed.  Looking at the criteria in 
section 3, showed that: 
• The developers did not accommodate import from 
or export to other CAD systems until the late 
1980’s.  They believed that all work could be done 
in Axxyz. 
• Direct user involvement was limited and occurred 
grudgingly.  In fact, most ‘users’ were part of an 
intermediary organization and not doing design 
work directly. 
• The user community was happy producing 
drawings. 
• A business commitment caused Boeing to purchase 
CAD software from Dassault Systemes in 1988.  
Since Boeing wasn’t using Axxyz (the commercial 
variant), the project died. 
 
4.3 Boeing Massive Model Viewing 
 
Designing aerospace products often stresses 
visualization software to its breaking point.  Boeing 
developed FlyThru, a heavily used Silicon Graphics-
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based viewer, in the early 1990’s [3].  FlyThru displayed 
as much geometry as could be fit into an SGI’s memory, 
about 5% of the geometry needed to represent a 
complete airplane. 
A PC-based viewer called IVT (Integration 
Visualization Tool) appeared in the early 2000’s that 
mimicked FlyThru in both function and capacity. The 
primary users were for the 787, which doubled the 
amount of 3D geometry over the 777. 
The development group had worked with the 
academic community to stimulate software 
development to produce software that could 
interactively display an entire 777.  The field became 
known as Massive Model Visualization (MMV) [14].   
The resulting IVT extension, called Superviewer, 
has been in production use since 2006.  While making 
Superviewer a production capability, it was not used 
widely until 2013-2014.  Looking back at the Section 3 
criteria, Superviewer did well by: 
• Finding commercial software (a library called vgr 
[2] that could be integrated directly into IVT. This 
made the user community happy because they did 
not need to learn a new interface. 
• Requiring little change to IVT software 
infrastructure. 
• Using the same data as ‘regular’ IVT. 
• Engaging end users to evaluate as development 
progressed. 
 
Broad adoption slowed because: 
• The groups that have used Superviewer most 
extensively did not appear until ~2012.  The 
developers assumed that design reviews would 
benefit most.  It turns out that manufacturing and 
support have had significantly more benefit. 
• Modification of IVT functions to work with 
Superviewer progressed slowly because of funding 
limitations. 
• Pre-processed Superviewer-formatted data did not 
exist until the early 2010’s. 
• Technical staff argued for other commercial 
viewers that did not scale. 
• Research staff developed their own special 
purpose viewers and did not care about MMV 
scale. 
 
Based on this, the odds of success were medium.  
Engagement to understand the breadth of applicability 
occurred much later than it should have. 
 
 
 
 
4.4 Microtel Pacific Research and Intelligent 
Graphic Interface 
 
The technical problem was managing complex 
hierarchical networks such as power distribution 
networks or telecommunications networks [9]. The 
technical community however was a combination of an 
academic research group and an industry applied 
research group (MPR), with the business community 
being the parent company of industry research group. 
This effort was a technical success, and having spent 
considerable effort on the issues of 3.2 and 3.3, at least 
got to the prototype stage, but ultimately the project 
faded in part due to not understanding the infrastructure 
of the business community well enough and not getting 
sufficient buy-in from senior levels of management in 
the business community. 
 
4.5 Continuous Zoom and Thoughtshare 
 
Here, a successful research project on visual 
navigation of the web [8] was spun into an ultimately 
unsuccessful startup [1] because the founders didn’t pay 
enough attention to their business community, i.e. to the 
marketing.  They failed to identify specific business 
problems that their technology would solve. So while 
the technology was successfully transferred into the 
startup from a research lab, the startup failed to pay 
enough attention to their ‘business community’. The 
model in fig. 2 would suggest a very low likelihood of 
success (see 3.1). 
 
5. Assessment 
 
The long-term basis for technology transfer is 
understanding the overall success of the technology 
adopters, not the developers.  Looking at projects ex 
post facto shows applicability as a way to assess the 
cause of project success or failure. 
A part of future work in this area would be to apply 
the guidelines to current ‘hot’ topics (e.g. augmented 
reality, artificial intelligence, machine learning, virtual 
reality, driverless cars) and track progress over time.   
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we’ve developed a model of the process 
of transitioning new technology from a “development 
group” we called the technical community, into a “using 
group” which we called the business community.  The 
model is based on experiences, some even successful, in 
technology transfer. Our model included basic inputs - 
the technology and the problem being solved – along 
with controls – viewpoints of both communities – and 
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the mechanism of understanding the infrastructure of the 
receiving community. Using this, one can get a measure 
of the likelihood of achieving a successful transfer.  We 
elaborated each of these items and described specific, 
real examples of technology transfer and tried to relate 
those to the model. 
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